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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA 
Alexandria Division 
BRIAN C. DAVISON, ) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Plaintiff, 
v. Civil Action No. 1:18-cv-1125 (AJTITCB) 
F ACEBOOK, INC., el af., 
Defendants. 
ORDER 
Plaintiff, appearing pro se, filed this action alleging a violation of his and others' First 
Amendment and Due Process rights against four Defendants-Facebook, Inc., YouTube, LLC, 
Twitter, Inc., and the Loudoun County School Board ("the School Board"). In response to the 
Complaint, defendants have filed motions to dismiss. I See Defendant Loudoun County School 
Board's Motion to Dismiss and Roseboro Notice [Doc. 57] and Defendants Facebook, Inc., 
YouTube, LLC, Twitter, Inco's Joint Motion to Dismiss [Doc. 61] ("the Motions') For the 
reasons stated below, the Motions are GRANTED. 
I. BACKGROUND 
Plaintiffs Amended Complaint alleges the following facts, which the Court assumes to 
be true for the purpose of the Motions: 
Plaintiff Brian C. Davison is a resident of Loudoun County, Virginia who has "taken an 
interest in the free speech rights of citizens within government-administered public fora:' [Doc. 
I Plaintiff filed this action on September 5, 2018. [Doc. I]. All Defendants filed motions to dismiss the Complaint 
on November 2,2018, and Plaintiff filed memoranda in opposition to Defendants' motions. [Docs. 29, 32, 41,42]. 
Before the Court ruled on the motions, Plaintiff sought and obtained leave to file the Amended Complaint, which he 
filed on January 3,2019. [Docs. 46,50,51). On January 3, 2019, Plaintiff also filed a Motion for Preliminary 
Injunction [Doc. 521. which is still pending. Defendants then filed the Motions on January 25. 2019. [Docs. 57. 61]. 
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51 at ~ 10]. According to Plaintiff, "[ e ]ach social media site operator publishes its own terms of 
service that forbids [sic] content based on viewpoint." Id at ~ 46. Those terms of service state 
that users may not share content that violates the site's "Community Standards." Id. at ~ 47. All 
of the social media Defendants' terms of service include similar bans on "hate speech" or 
"incit[ing] hatred against individuals or groups based on certain attributes:' Id. at ~~ 47-49. 
Each of the social media Defendants maintains a policy of deleting content that violates these 
terms and/or banning or blocking users that share such content. Id. at ~~ 51-59. All three of the 
social media Defendants "invite[]" and "encourage[]" government organizations to use their 
services. Id at ~~ 60-63. 
The School Board has created pages on all three of the social media Defendants' 
platforms. Id at ~ 64-70. According to Plaintiff, by creating these pages and agreeing to the 
social media Defendants' terms of use, the School Board "agreed to ... [their] viewpoint-based 
content moderation and banning of users based on past speech within their platforms. Id. at ~ 71. 
Therefore, the School Board "is entwined with Defendant social media operators in the 
management and control of user comments on [the School Board]'s social media pages." Id. at 
~ 72. Conversely, "[b]y retaining the authority to moderate content on [the School Board]'s 
social media pages and to ban users from participating in those forums, Defendants Facebook, 
YouTube and Twitter constitute state actors with respect to the administration of [the School 
Board]'s social media public forums." Id at ~ 73. Further, as a result of these terms of use, 
"[w]illing [s]peakers are [c]hilled by [the] Service Providers' [p]rohibitions." Id. at 13 
(heading). 
In Counts III and IV, Plaintiff alleges that he suffered an injury to his First Amendment 
and Due Process rights when certain of his posted comments on the School Board's website were 
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deleted as a result of those policies. In that regard, on August 21, 2018, employees of the School 
Board created a post on their Facebook page that included the Superintendent's "back to school 
message video." Id at ~ 98. Shortly thereafter, Plaintiff created two comments on this post "that 
were critical of [the School Board]'s policies and the resulting standardized test scores." Id at ~ 
99. Within a week, the comments were removed or hidden from the School Board's social 
media page. Id at ~ 100. When asked, School Board officials "denied removing or hiding the 
comments." Id at ~ 101. A nearly identical series of events occurred again on August 27, 2018, 
after Plaintiff left comments on another School Board post. See id. at ~~ 102-05. In a prior case 
involving Plaintiff and the School Board, Facebook admitted that its systems had deleted 
comments on the School Board's Facebook page in July 2016 without providing notice to the 
user whose comments were deleted, and "asserted that its systems had been updated and would 
no'longer delete such content." Id at ~ 106. In October 2018, this happened again, and the 
School Board Supervisor denied deleting the comments. Id. at ~ 107. Later, Facebook's counsel 
"acknowledged the comments were deleted by its systems." Id at 108. Despite subsequent 
assurances by Facebook that it would not delete any more content on the School Board's pages, 
"Facebook continues to delete comments on government social media pages throughout its 
systems without any notice to the affected users." Id. at ~~ 106, 109. 
Finally, Plaintiff alleges that Facebook, YouTube, and Twitter all promulgate terms of 
service that "require that any user who wishes to comment on their platform's social media pages 
consent to litigating any disputes in a court based in California," while simultaneously relieving 
government users of these venue restrictions. Id at ~~ 118-19. According to Plaintiff: these 
provisions "chill the speech of willing speakers and threaten enforcement actions against 
engaged citizens," and "[t]he requirement for users to consent to litigate any constitutional 
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violations by Defendants in a court room thousands of miles away from the local government 
that sponsors the page is an unreasonable prior restraint to a limited public forum." Id at 
~~ 120-21. 
The Amended Complaint contains five counts: Violation of Free Speech Rights 
Guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth Amendments Via Viewpoint Discrimination, against all 
four Defendants (Count I); Violation of Free Speech and Due Process Rights Guaranteed by the 
First and Fourteenth Amendments Via Unconstitutional Prior Restraints, against all four 
Defendants (Count II); Deletion of Davison's Comments on [the School Board]'s Social Media 
Pages Violates His Free Speech Rights (As Applied), against Defendant Facebook (Count III); 
Deletion of Davison's Comments on [the School Board]'s Social Media Pages Without Any 
Notice Violates His Due Process Rights (As Applied ), against Defendant Facebook (Count IV); 
and Defendants' Terms of Service Are an Unconstitutional Prior Restraint on a Limited Public 
Forum-Government Social Media Pages, against all four Defendants (Count V). See [Doc. 51]. 
Plaintiff seeks (1) declarations that the social media Defendants' policies governing user 
comments on the School Board's social media pages are unconstitutional; (2) a declaration that 
the social media Defendant's terms of service "requiring all disputes be litigated in a California 
venue to be unconstitutional when the dispute involves government social media pages 
administered as limited public forums"; (3) a declaration that "the [School Board]'s social media 
pages ... are full or limited public fora"; (4) a declaration that the deletion of his comments on 
the School Board's pages violated his First Amendment and Due Process rights; and (5) an 
injunction requiring restoration of all of his deleted comments. Id. at 21-22. 
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II. LEGAL STANDARD 
"To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, 
accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face. '" Ashcrqfi v. Iqbal, 556 
U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,570 (2007». 
Although a pro se party's complaint must be construed liberally, it must nevertheless comply 
with the proper pleading rules and allege some comprehensible basis for the Court's jurisdiction. 
See Giarratano v. Johnson, 521 F.3d 298, 304 n.5 (4th CiT. 2008) (stating that a pro se complaint 
must provide "more than labels and conclusions" (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting 
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555»; Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387, 391 (4th Cir. 1990) 
("The special judicial solicitude with which a district court should view ... pro se complaints 
does not transform the court into an advocate. Only those questions which are squarely 
presented to a court may be properly addressed" (quotation omitted»; Beaudett v. City qf 
Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985) (explaining that "[p]rinciples requiring generous 
construction of pro se complaints are not ... without limits" and district judges "cannot be 
expected to construct full blown claims from sentence fragments"). 
To establish standing, a plaintiff must satisfy the "case or controversy" requirement of 
Article III by demonstrating that he had the requisite stake in the outcome when the suit was 
filed and that the alleged prospective injury qualifies for redress. Specifically, the plaintiff must 
show (1) he has suffered an "injury in fact," (2) the injury is "fairly traceable" to the actions of 
the defendant, and (3) the injury will likely be redressed by a favorable decision. Lujan v. 
Defenders of WildNfe, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992). An injury in fact is "an invasion of a 
legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized and (b) actual or imminent, not 
conjectural or hypothetical." Id at 560. 
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III. ANALYSIS 
The School Board seeks dismissal on the grounds that Plaintiff lacks Article 1II standing 
because he has not alleged that the School Board caused any concrete injury to him, and 
alternatively because he fails to allege a policy or practice attributable to the School Board. 
[Doc. 58 at 2-6]. Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube move to dismiss on the grounds that (1) they 
"are not state actors subject to the First and Fourteenth Amendments;" and (2) "Plaintiff has 
suffered no injury and therefore lacks standing to bring any claims against Y ouTube and 
Twitter." [Doc. 62 at 1]. 
A. Loudoun County School Board's Motion to Dismiss [Doc. 57] 
Based on the allegations in the Amended Complaint, Plaintiff does not have standing to 
sue the School Board for the alleged harms. Specifically, with respect to Counts I, II, and V, he 
has not alleged an injury in fact, and as to Counts III and IV, the injury he allegedly suffered-
the deletion of his comments on the LCSB site-is not alleged to be fairly traceable to the 
School Board. 
Counts I, II, and V are general challenges to the School Board and the social media 
Defendants' content policies, and they allege various forms of "chilling effects" that these 
policies have on the public at large. Paragraphs 93 and 94 are representative. They state, 
92. Defendants Facebook, Twitter and YouTube's express policy states that they 
will ban users from commenting on the LCSB social media pages based on 
viewpoint-based criteria and prior speech. 
93. Defendants' express policy calls for banning users based on prior speech 
without providing for protections required by law, namely the initiation of legal 
proceedings by the government or state actor to obtain injunctions against future 
speech by the offending user. 
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94. Such user bans represent unconstitutional prior restraints and violate both free 
speech and due process rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the 
United States Constitution. 
None of these or any other paragraphs in Counts I, III, and V point to any injury in fact that 
Plaintiff himself has suffered or any action that any of the Defendants (including the School 
Board) took against him. Accordingly, he lacks standing as to those counts because he has not 
alleged an injury in fact. 
In contrast, Plaintiff does allege that he suffered a specific injury in Counts III and IV. 
However, he essentially concedes in the Amended Complaint that this injury is not fairly 
traceable to the School Board, which is not listed as a Defendant in Counts III or IV. Id. at 17. 
Moreover, in Count III, he alleges that the School Board members denied that they deleted in 
August and October 2018 his comments on posts on the School Board's or the Loudoun County 
Supervisor's Facebook pages and that Facebook's counsel later "acknowledged the [October 
2018] comments were deleted by its systems." Id. at ~~ 102-05, 107-08. Although the 
Amended Complaint only specifically states that Facebook acknowledged that it deleted the 
October 2018 comments, it is clear from the factual context and all reasonable inferences drawn 
therefrom that Plaintiff alleges that Facebook deleted all three sets of comments. Accordingly, 
although the Amended Complaint alleges that the comments were deleted from a Facebook page 
affiliated with the School Board, it does not allege that the School Board had any involvement in 
any of these deletions. Count IV simply incorporates those same allegations. Id. at ~~ 113-15. 
Plaintiff has therefore failed to allege facts sufficient to establish standing to sue the School 
Board. 
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B. Facebook, YouTube, and Twitter's Joint Motion to Dismiss [Doc. 61] 
Based on the allegations of the Amended Complaint, Plaintiff also lacks standing as to 
Defendants YouTube and Twitter. In that regard, the specific allegations against YouTube and 
Twitter are that the School Board has created accounts on them, that those accounts constitute 
limited public fora, that these Defendants "retain authority and the ability to moderate content 
within LCSB's social media pages on their respective platforms," that this retained authority 
makes them "state actors," and that because their terms of use state that they will "delete 
content" or "ban users" on the Board's social media pages based on viewpoint-based criteria," 
these Defendants violate the First Amendment's prohibition on viewpoint discrimination. See, 
e.g., [Doc. 51 at ~~ 84-88]. Count V further alleges that YouTube and Twitter have terms of 
service that "require that any user who wishes to comment on their platform's social media pages 
consent to litigating any disputes in a court based in California," and that these terms constitute 
"an unreasonable prior restraint to a limited public forum" by forcing "users to consent to litigate 
any constitutional violations by Defendants in a court room thousands of miles away from the 
local government that sponsors the page." [d. at ~~ 1 18, 121. 
None of these general allegations allege facts that make plausible that the Plaintiff 
personally was harmed. He does not allege anywhere in the Amended Complaint that he has 
created accounts on either of these social media platforms, nor does he allege that any comments 
of his were deleted by these Defendants. Even construing the Amended Complaint liberally and 
drawing all reasonable inferences in Plaintiffs favor, the Amended Complaint contains no 
factual allegations tying any action of these two social media Defendants to any harm Plaintiff 
suffered, because the only allegations specific to him are allegations concerning the deletion of 
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his comments on Facebook. Accordingly, Plaintiff has failed to allege facts that make plausible 
that he has standing to sue Defendants YouTube and Twitter. 
As to Defendant Facebook, Plaintiff alleges he has suffered a concrete injury resulting 
from Facebook's conduct but he has failed to state a cognizable constitutional claim because he 
has failed to allege facts that make plausible that Facebook acted as a state actor. Plaintiff argues 
that Facebook (as well as Defendants YouTube and Twitter) acted as a state actor because of the 
following: 
• "By retaining the authority to exercise administrative control over 
comments within Defendant LCSB's social media pages and by issuing an 
explicit policy governing the content on such pages, Defendants Facebook, 
YouTube and Twitter constitute state actors with respect to LCSB's social 
media pages on their respective social media sites." (~84]; 
• "By retaining the authority to moderate content on LCSB's social media 
pages and to ban users from participating in those forums, Defendants 
Facebook, YouTube and Twitter constitute state actors with respect to the 
administration ofLCSB's social media public forums." (~73]; 
• "By creating the social media pages on Facebook, YouTube and Twitter, 
LCPS agreed to the terms of service for each social media operator 
including its viewpoint-based content moderation and banning of users 
based on past speech within their platforms. Therefore, LCSB is entwined 
with Defendant social media operators in the management and control of 
user comments on LCSB's social media pages. By retaining the authority 
to moderate content on LCSB's social media pages and to ban users from 
participating in those forums, Defendants Facebook, YouTube and Twitter 
constitute state actors with respect to the administration of LCSB's social 
media public forums." [~~ 71-73 (paragraph divisions omitted)]. 
The social media Defendants are indisputably private companies. But "a claim under 42 
U.S.C. § 1983 requires that the defendant be fairly said to be a state actor." DeBauche v. Trani, 
191 F.3d 499, 506 (4th Cir. 1999). Therefore, they are only subject to constitutional claims 
against them if they were serving as de faCIO state actors in administering the School Board's 
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social media sites or promulgating their terms of service. Under governing case law, private 
parties will not be deemed de facIO state actors "unless the state has so dominated such activity 
as to convert it into state action: 'Mere approval of or acquiescence in the initiatives of a private 
party' is insufficient." Id. at 507 (quoting Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1004 (1982». Such 
domination exists if"the State has exercised coercive power or has provided such significant 
encouragement that the choice must in law be deemed to be that ofthe State." Id. (internal 
quotation marks and alteration omitted). 
Based on this principle and further refinements set out by the Supreme Court in 
subsequent decisions, the Fourth Circuit has recognized "four exclusive circumstances under 
which a private party can be deemed to be a state actor." Andrews v. Federal Home Loan Bank 
of Atlanta, 998 F.2d 214, 217 (4th Cir. 1993). These are: 
(1) when the state has coerced the private actor to commit an act that would be 
unconstitutional if done by the state; (2) when the state has sought to evade a clear 
constitutional duty through delegation to a private actor; (3) when the state has 
delegated a traditionally and exclusively public function to a private actor; or (4) 
when the state has committed an unconstitutional act in the course of enforcing a 
right of a private citizen. 
Id. "If the conduct does not fall into one of these four categories, then the private conduct is not 
an action of the state." Id. 
The facts alleged in the Amended Complaint do not establish, or make reasonably 
inferable, that any of these factors is present in Facebook's relationship with the School Board, 
its promulgation of the applicable terms of service, or its administration of the School Board's 
social media pages pursuant to the terms of service. There is no suggestion that the School 
Board "coerced" or even discussed deleting Plaintiffs comments on Facebook. Nor is there any 
suggestion that the School Board or any other government actor delegated any functions to 
10 
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Facebook with regard to its management of its social media pages. In fact, Plaintiff alleges the 
contrary in the Amended Complaint when he states that "LCSB retains the ability to delete user 
comments or block users from commenting on their social media pages." [Doc. 51 at ~ 83]. 
Similarly, there is no indication that the School Board or any other state actor coerced or even 
conferred with Facebook regarding its terms of service, which, as Plaintiff admits in the 
Amended Complaint, apply universally to government and non-government social media users. 
See id. at ~ 52 ("Defendant social media operators' viewpoint-based content policies operate 
equally across all social media pages on its sites including pages controlled by government 
organizations such as Defendant LCSB. "). 
Under these circumstances, Facebook cannot be deemed a state actor. For that reason, 
Facebook has, as a private entity, the right to regulate the content of its platforms as it sees fit. 
See La'Tiejira v. Facebook, Inc., 272 F. Supp. 3d 981,991 (S.D. Tex. 2017) (observing that 
Facebook has a "First Amendment right to decide what to publish and what not to publish on its 
platform"). Indeed, the Fourth Circuit has held that a private party was not a state actor for 
purposes of a § 1983 claim when the private party was significantly more "entwined" with state 
actors and engaged in a more traditional public forum than Facebook is in this case. For 
example, in DeBauche, the Court held that the plaintiff, a gubernatorial candidate, did not state a 
§ 1983 claim against a privately employed debate moderator and private television broadcasters 
when she alleged that they excluded her from a debate held at Virginia Commonwealth 
University (a state university), which she alleged was a public forum. 191 FJd at 502-03. Her 
complaint alleged that the moderator and broadcasters were state actors liable for excluding her 
because they coordinated with the public university to use its property, "staff and other resources 
to plan, promote, manage and execute the debate." Id. at 503-04. The Court disagreed, holding 
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that the private parties' conduct in organizing, moderating, and sponsoring the debate were 
functions that are "not within the exclusive prerogative of the government." Id at 508-09. The 
Court observed that the private parties also had First Amendment rights, namely, the right to 
"select the content" of the debates they host, which amounts to "independently-motivated, 
private actions, rather than state action." Id at 509 (internal quotation marks and alteration 
omitted). Similarly, in United Auto Workers v. Gaston Festivals, Inc., the Fourth Circuit held 
that a private entity which organized a public festival that was held on public property and partly 
paid for with public money was not a state actor. 43 F.3d 902, 906 (4th Cir. 1995). 
Accordingly, Plaintiff has failed to state a plausible claim that Facebook is a state actor 
subject to the alleged constitutional guarantees. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Accordingly, it is hereby 
ORDERED that Defendant Loudoun County School Board's Motion to Dismiss and 
Roseboro Notice [Doc. 57] and Defendants Facebook, Inc., YouTube, LLC, Twitter, Inc.'s Joint 
Motion to Dismiss [Doc. 61] be, and the same hereby are, GRANTED; and this action is 
DISMISSED; and it is further 
ORDERED that Plaintiff's Motion for a Preliminary Injunction [Doc. 52] and Motion for 
Leave to File Reply Briefs for Plaintiff's Preliminary Injunction Out of Time and Leave to 
Withdraw Doc. No. 67 [Doc. 71] be, and the same hereby are, DENIED as moot. 
This is a Final Order for purposes of appeal. To appeal, Plaintiff must file a written 
notice of appeal with the Clerk's Office within thirty (30) days of the date of this Order as 
required by Rules 3 and 4 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure. A written notice of 
appeal is a short statement stating a desire to appeal this Order along with the date of the Order 
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plainl iff wanlS 10 appeal. Pla intiff need not explain the grounds lor appeal until so directed by 
the Court. 
The Clerk is directed to forward a copy of thi s Orde r to all counselor record and to pro 
se Plainli ff at the address provided. 
f ebruary 26, 2019 
Alexandria. Virginia 
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